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Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception
In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that 
perceptual experience1  is cognitively penetrable.2  Here is a characterisation of 
cognitive penetration and the cognitive penetrability thesis:
 Cognitive Penetration: cognitive penetration is possible iff it is possible for 
 two subjects to have experiences which differ in content and/or 
 phenomenal character, where this difference is the result of a causal 
 process that traces more or less directly to states in the subjects’ cognitive 
 system, and where we hold fixed the the perceptual stimuli, the condition of 
 the subjects’ sensory organs, the environmental conditions, and, the 
 attentional focus of the subjects.
 Cog-Pen Thesis: at least some experiences of human beings are 
 cognitively penetrated.
Some clarification: in characterising cognitive penetration in terms of differences 
in content and character I am assuming a representational view of experience. 
According to this, experiences have contents which can be spelt out in terms of 
their accuracy conditions, and there is some important relation between content 
and phenomenal character, e.g., supervenience. 
Cognitive penetration involves alterations in experience which are the result of 
causal influence from the subject’s cognitive system. Two things to note: firstly, I 
am understanding ‘cognitive system’ broadly so as to include beliefs, desires, 
emotions, intuitions, concepts. Secondly, the causal impact that the cognitive 
system has in penetration should be distinguished from trivial cases where a 
subject’s cognitive system causes them to have a different experience due to its 
bringing about changes in bodily position, e.g., my desire to see the bewildering 
1
1 Hereafter I speak of ‘experience’ rather than ‘perceptual experience’.
2  See, e.g., Lyons 2011, Macpherson 2012, Siegel 2012, 2013, Stokes 2012, forthcoming, Vance 
forthcoming. 
Suilven3 causes me to turn my body (and eyes) in its direction, thus having an 
experience of it.4 
The Cog-Pen Thesis is that cognitive penetration exists. Although the question of 
whether it does is by no means settled, there are many suggestive studies 
apparently supporting it5  and a priori arguments6 in its favour. Hereafter I will 
assume that cognitive penetration is indeed a psychologically real occurrence. My 
focus will be on specific philosophical consequences that might follow. 
As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has 
implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could 
make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ 
their experience.7  For example, if my expectational belief that ‘bananas are 
yellow’ comes to systematically bias my perceptual system towards representing 
bananas as yellow (even when the banana I’m confronted with isn’t yellow), then 
this might reduce or eliminate the justification-conferring power of my 
experiences of the yellowness of bananas. 
On the other hand, cognitive penetration could be epistemically beneficial by 
making agents more sensitive to the way the world is, i.e., by enabling them to 
see things that others cannot. For example, penetration could ground a ‘high-
level’ view of perceptual content,8  according to which agents can have 
2
3 Suilven is a hill located in the spectacular Sutherland region of northwest Scotland.
4  Two further clarifications: firstly, the ‘more or less directly’ clause is to allow for cases where a cognitive 
state might influence perceptual experience indirectly. The sort of cases I have in mind are where a cognitive 
state causes the formation of some intermediary phenomenal state, or a non-cognitive state, which in turn 
affect the content and/or character of experience, e.g., my belief that the interview is tomorrow might cause 
me to have a migraine which in turn causes an experience of red flashing. It is of course a matter of 
controversy whether these cases count as cognitive penetration. Secondly, and relatedly, one might want to 
impose a semantic condition on cognitive penetration, such that there has to be some sort of logical or 
semantic coherence relation between the penetrator and penetrated states. See, e.g., Macpherson 2012, 
Pylyshyn 1999, and Stokes forthcoming for discussion.
5 See, e.g., Bruner and Goodman 1947, Delk and Filenbaum 1965, Hansen et al. 2006; Witzel et al 2011. 
6 See Siegel 2006, 2007 for discussion of the method of phenomenal contrast.
7 See Siegel 2013 for discussion.
8 See, e.g., Bayne 2009, Siegel 2006
experiences as of ‘complex’ properties, e.g., natural kind and aesthetic 
properties. Relatedly, it could elucidate the view that agents can gain perceptual 
expertise, e.g., ornithological, by learning. 
A type of sophisticated perception (and associated ‘perceptual expertise’) which 
has hitherto received little attention in relation to cognitive penetration is ethical 
perception. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature.
Although it is uncontroversial that perception can provide agents with non-ethical 
information which may partially ground ethical judgment, some ethical traditions 
appeal to a notion of ‘ethical perception’ which appears to go beyond this. Call 
these views ‘Perceptualist’. Significant examples of Perceptualism can be found in 
the Virtue Ethics, Cornell Realist, and Ethical Intuitionist traditions.9 I will say more 
about these later. In the meantime, in order to get the flavour of Perceptualism, 
consider the following example:
! Cat: If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour 
 gasoline on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they 
 are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you can see that 
 it is wrong.10
Despite appealing to ‘ethical perception’ as part of their views, it isn’t always clear 
how literally Perceptualists intend this.11  One way of sharpening loose talk of 
‘ethical perception’, which has been the subject of much recent discussion,12 is 
the following view:
3
9 Another example can be found in Korsgaard’s 1996 view that we cannot help seeing each other as ends.
10 From Harman, 1977, p. 4
11  e.g., Harman, who presents the Cat example, thinks that ethical observation is simply a psychologically 
immediate judgment on the basis of the way things look. See his 1977, p. 7. 
12 See Cowan forthcoming a, forthcoming b, Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010b, McGrath 2004, Vayrynen 2008.
 Ethical Perception: human agents can have perceptual experiences as of the 
 instantiation of ethical properties, at least some of which are veridical.13
I will say more about this view and how it relates to varieties of Perceptualism 
shortly. For now let me bring this brief excursion into metaethics back to 
cognitive penetration. The idea to be considered is that cognitive penetration 
provides a way of grounding the truth of Ethical Perception, i.e., states in a 
subject’s cognitive system could causally produce experiences with ethical 
contents. In doing so, cognitive penetration potentially has significance for 
Perceptualist views.
In this paper I examine the relationship between cognitive penetrability and three 
types of Perceptualism in ethics. The results are somewhat mixed: although 
cognitive penetrability does not support Perceptual Intuitionism, it may provide 
some limited support for Virtue Ethics and Cornell Realism. However, its 
significance should not be overstated. 
After outlining the relation between Ethical Perception and brands of 
Perceptualism in detail in §1, in §2 I suggest that a cognitive penetration model is 
the most plausible account of Ethical Perception. In §3 I argue that this model 
doesn’t obviously constitute a theoretical advance for Virtue Ethicists. In §4 I 
discuss the epistemology of cognitively penetrated ethical experience, arguing 
that Cornell Realism is better supported by a cognitive penetration model than 
Perceptual Intuitionism. In §5 I conclude.
I. Ethical Perception and Perceptualism
In this section I clarify Ethical Perception and its motivations. This will involve a 
fuller discussion of forms of Perceptualism.
4
13  I follow recent discussions in assuming a representational view of perception and focusing on visual 
perceptual experience. For what it’s worth I think that it may be possible to represent ethical properties in 
audition, e.g., I could hear her demeaning tone.
Proponents of Ethical Perception think that agents can sometimes literally see the 
instantiation of ethical properties. This should be distinguished from the view that 
we can see scenarios that, as a matter of fact, instantiate ethical properties (de re 
ethical perception). Ethical Perception captures the idea that, even if we assume 
an intimate connection between ethical properties and non-ethical natural 
properties, e.g., reduction or exhaustive constitution, one could only be said to 
have an ethical visual experience by visually representing the instantiation of 
ethical properties.14 
Ethical Perception can be motivated by appeal to the phenomenology of ethical 
experience. Cat is one case among many. Here is another:
 Change of Subject: Mary is in the restaurant with her friends celebrating her 
 birthday. As the centre of attention she is enjoying being teased. But then 
 the teasing begins to get a bit too much for her, and she starts to get 
 upset. She is about to cry. Jack, who is a kind person, recognises that Mary 
 is getting needlessly upset and is about to cry, and he immediately changes 
 the subject. The awkward moment is passed, and Mary is happy again.15 
In this case, the phenomenology of Jack’s recognition of Mary’s plight can be 
reasonably described perceptually, i.e., as seeing an ethical ‘affordance’ of the 
situation (similar to ‘edibility’); that Mary can be helped or the to-be-doneness of 
a particular action.
Support for Ethical Perception can also be garnered from the aforementioned 
high-level view of perceptual content: if perceivers can represent, e.g., natural 
kinds, in experience, then it is perhaps less incredible to think that agents can 
have experiences of wrongness, or ethical affordances.
5
14 Although Ethical Perception would seem to be of primary appeal to Ethical Naturalists two things should be 
kept in mind: (i) there is no consensus on how best to characterise ‘natural’, and (ii) McBrayer (2010a) has 
plausibly argued that Ethical Perception is compatible with some form of non-naturalism.
15 From Goldie 2007, p. 1 
However, the principal motivation for defending Ethical Perception is that it 
promises to support a version of Perceptualism. 
Perhaps the most well-known form of Perceptualism is in the Virtue Ethics 
tradition.16  Some modern Virtue Ethicists conceive of the virtuous agent as 
possessing a perceptual ability which is the product of habituation. On this view, 
the virtuous person can just ‘see’ what to do, and is appropriately motivated by 
what they can see. More specifically, seeing which of the potentially action-
relevant features of a given scenario is “salient” apparently necessitates 
motivation, silencing other considerations. On some views (see especially, Little 
and McDowell) ethical ‘vision’ is motivating due to its being tied to a “conception 
of how to live” which is distinctive of the virtuous agent.
Although a prominent version of Perceptualism, there is an important question as 
to whether the Virtue Ethicists’s perceptual model is merely figurative. One way in 
which it could be is if the appeal to ‘ethical perception’ is simply a way of 
capturing some perceptual-like aspects of the virtuous agent’s ability, e.g., the 
non-inferential character of their judgments, and the resistance of their ability to 
propositional capture, say, as a stock of general ethical principles. On this sort of 
view, the perceptual ability is just a sort of recognitional ability (cf. Dancy 1993 on 
a “contentless ability to discern reasons”17) which issues in ethical judgment and 
action.
Another, perhaps less metaphorical, model18 involves cashing the virtuous agent’s 
perceptual ability in terms of emotional responses. On this sort of view, the 
virtuous agent’s affective dispositions constitute their ‘seeing’ what situations 
demand, motivating them appropriately: the virtuous can “see the demands of 
6
16 See, e.g., Goldie 2007, Little 1997, Lovibond 2002, McDowell 1998, Murdoch 1970. Here I focus on Neo-
Aristotelian brands of virtue ethics. I discuss Murdoch, who is harder to place, in §3.
17 Dancy is not a virtue ethicist, but is committed to a particularist epistemology.
18  For the view that emotions are perceptions see Doring 2003 and Prinz 2004. For criticism, see Brady 
2013.
kindness by feeling them.”19 This emotional model could be freestanding or serve 
as a compliment to the recognitional model, e.g., the virtuous agent’s 
recognitional ability might be a partial product of the training of their affective 
responses, some of which may be due to imaginative engagement (cf. Goldie 
2007).  
Despite the existence of these models, Virtue Ethicists might be motivated to 
defend Ethical Perception as a more ‘robust’ way of cashing out ethical virtue: 
virtuous agents experience the instantiation of ethical properties. I assess 
cognitive penetration’s bearing on the prospects for Virtue Ethics in §3.
Another version of Perceptualism can be found among Cornell Realists.20 Cornell 
Realists share a commitment to the metaphysical view that, although ethical 
properties are not reducible (analytically or non-analytically) to other natural 
properties, they are themselves natural properties. The distinguishing feature of 
Cornell Realism, however, can be found in their epistemological outlook. Inspired 
by developments in the philosophy science, Cornell Realists draw a parallel 
between the supposed theory-ladenness of scientific judgment and observation 
with that of ethical judgment and perception. Proponents claim that ethics is, like 
other sciences, autonomous in the following sense: just as there is no reasonable 
inference from non-biological evidence to biological claims (absent some 
background theory), there is no reasonable inference from non-ethical evidence 
to ethical conclusions. Ethical judgments and evidence must always be assessed 
in the context of other ethical judgments.
However, just as theory-ladenness doesn’t preclude an important role for 
scientific observation and intuition, Cornell Realists think that there is such a 
thing as ethical perception: “people can observe - that is, see with their eyes - 
that good or bad things are happening, that someone is doing something wrong, 
7
19 Jacobsen 2005, p. 393. 
20 See, e.g., Boyd 1988, Brink 1989, and Sturgeon 2002. They all taught or studied at Cornell University.
and the like”21. Like scientific observation, ethical perception can sometimes make 
explicit what agents were perhaps unconsciously committed to, but is best 
understood as involving a sort of inference: it is “automatic and unconscious, and 
among the premises are moral views one already has.”22 This lends itself to an 
inferentialist epistemology for ethical observation (more on the distinction 
between inferential and non-inferential justification below).
Although it is not entirely clear whether Cornell Realists intend talk of ethical 
perception to be taken literally, they might be attracted to defending a version of 
Ethical Perception as a way of supplementing their view. I assess the bearing of 
cognitive penetrability on Cornell Realism when I discuss the epistemology of 
cognitively penetrable ethical experience in §4.
The final brand of Perceptualism that I discuss is that held by some Ethical 
Intuitionists.23 Intuitionism is minimally the view that there are at least some non-
inferentially justified ethical beliefs. On one popular (and permissive) view, S’s 
belief that p is non-inferentially justified iff S’s belief that p is justified and S 
hasn’t inferred (either explicitly or implicitly) p from another belief. A more 
restrictive account assumes that S’s belief that p is non-inferentially justified iff 
S’s belief that p is justified independently of S having justification for believing 
propositions other than p. Although the view has been associated with 
metaphysical views like non-naturalism, the view is compatible with reductive and 
non-reductive forms of naturalism. Like Cornell Realists, Intuitionists think that 
ethical claims cannot be inferred from purely non-ethical premises; however, 
unlike Cornell Realists, they are keen to defend the theory-independence of 
ethical judgments, a feature they associate with non-inferential justification.24
8
21 2002, p. 205
22 Ibid, p. 205
23 See, e.g., Audi 2013, Prichard 1912, Ross 1930.
24 See Audi 2004 for a statement of this.
If one was attracted to ethical naturalism and wanted to defend an Intuitionist 
epistemology, then Ethical Perception might be appealing since it could 
potentially ground Perceptual Intuitionism: ethical agents can have non-
inferentially justified ethical beliefs on the basis of ethical experience. Such a view 
could plausibly constitute an independent a posteriori alternative to a priori and 
affectual Intuitionist accounts, whilst sidestepping worries that Intuitionism 
requires positing some dedicated ethical faculty (see Mackie 1977).
However, in order to do so, the non-inferential justification that ethical 
experience confers must not be of an epistemically dependent sort:
 Epistemic Dependence: A state or process, e, epistemically depends 
 upon another state, d, with respect to content c iff state or process e is 
 justified or justification-conferring with respect to c only if (and partly 
 because) d is justified or justification-conferring with respect to c.
To understand how a belief might be non-inferentially justified but be derived 
from an epistemically dependent source consider that on one plausible view of 
memory - Preservationism25 - remembering is an epistemically dependent source 
of justification, even if memorial beliefs are non-inferentially justified. That is, 
memorial beliefs are justified only if the subject previously had some non-
memorial justification for the belief. 
If ethical experience is epistemically dependent, then this would undermine the 
prospects for an independent a posteriori Intuitionist account because the view 
would be importantly incomplete: we would still be owed an account of an 
9
25 See, e.g., Senor 2007.
epistemically independent source of non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, and 
this might require appealing to intuition or emotion as epistemic sources.26 
So for Ethical Perception to hold significance for an independent Perceptual 
Intuitionism, ethical experience should be epistemically independent. I assess 
whether a cognitive penetration model of Ethical Perception can deliver this in §4.
As should be clear, Ethical Perception could provide support for varieties of 
Perceptualism. In the next section I provide some reason to think that a cognitive 
penetration model of Ethical Perception is most promising.
II. Towards the Cognitive Penetration Model
Independently of any particular ethical view, are there any reasons for thinking 
that a cognitive penetration model is likely to be the most plausible way of 
accounting for Ethical Perception? In this section I suggest an affirmative answer.
An alternative model of Ethical Perception that someone might defend is what I 
call the ‘Intra-Perceptual Model’. On this view, ethical experience is made possible 
by learning involving an “associative process that takes place solely within the 
visual system”.27 Ethical perceptual learning would be due to repeated exposure 
to ethical sensory stimuli and top-down processing within the system, with the 
result that agents are able to represent the instantiation of ethical properties in 
experience.
For example, perhaps my being repeatedly exposed to cases of suffering has 
meant that my visual system has come to classify certain low-level properties 
under the category SUFFERING. Through a similar process, it may also have come to 
10
26 Two other possibilities: suppose that ethical experiences were epistemically dependent upon inferentially 
justified beliefs. For epistemological reasons, it would seem odd to call the resulting view ‘Intuitionist’ (this 
might be due to its association with Foundationalism - note, however, that the views are, strictly-speaking, 
distinct). Further, if ethical experience were epistemically dependent upon ethical testimony then this raises 
worries about a regress of ethical testimony, as well as concerns about subject’s entitlement to ethical beliefs 
held on the basis of testimony. See Hopkins 2007 for the view that ethical testimony doesn’t confer 
entitlement to ethical belief.
27 Macpherson 2012, p. 33. Of course, we need not limit this model to vision.
classify certain cases of suffering under the category WRONGNESS. As a result, when 
confronted with the Cat case, I might visually represent the wrongness of what the 
youths are doing, where this is due to a process of learning that takes place 
within the visual system itself.
An objection: unless the perceptual system is in some sense hard-wired for 
ethical representation - as is plausibly the case for colours and shapes - it is hard 
to see how the perceptual system could come to classify certain stimuli under 
ethical categories by itself, i.e., in the absence of cognition. Furthermore, ethical 
perceptual representation is not hard-wired, so the view is a non-starter.
In response, a proponent of the Intra-Perceptual model who accepts this general 
point (i.e., that perception couldn’t come to classify stimuli under ethical 
categories by itself without ethical representation being hard-wired)28, should 
claim that it is perhaps not implausible to think that the perceptual system of 
ordinary human beings could come purpose built for ethical representation. This 
is because it fulfills a plausible necessary condition for being hard-wired. 
Consider the following from Macpherson (2012):
 “the cognitively unadulterated system will have limited representational 
 powers - no doubt powers to represent only that which is likely to be 
 encountered by most humans in different locations and at different times - 
 powers that are likely to be useful to all. These representational powers will 
 extend to properties such as shape, colour and size”.29
The point of interest here is that it is not implausible to think that the power to 
perceptually represent ethical properties, e.g., wrongness, might be useful for 
humans in most environments they are likely to find themselves in. Given that a 
capacity to perceptually detect ethical properties could alert perceivers to the 
11
28 For doubts about this see Pylyshyn, 1999 p. 361
29 Macpherson, 2012, p. 33
presence of threats or potential cooperative partners, it could have considerable 
fitness value. Perhaps the Intra-Perceptual model is not so far-fetched after all.
There are two things to say in response. Firstly, the claim that a disposition to 
represent ethical properties might be useful to most subjects in various 
environments may be disputed. One thought is that if a disposition to represent 
ethical properties is already ‘hard-wired’ in other systems, e.g., the emotional 
system, then there would be no obvious evolutionary point to perceptual hard-
wiring too. Secondly, even if one accepted the point about the utility of ethical 
perceptual representation, it is important to stress that Macpherson’s condition is 
only a necessary condition for perceptual hard-wiring, and hence support for the 
model might remain weak (it couldn’t be a sufficient condition: it may be useful 
for everyone to have x-ray vision, but alas, we don’t).
One additional, and important, reason to think that the Intra-Perceptual model 
couldn’t be the whole story (or any of it) in accounting for Ethical Perception is 
that it might be overly restrictive. For recall that the model requires that we are 
repeatedly perceptually exposed to ethical scenarios. However, we might think 
that an ethical perceiver’s capacities for ethical perceptual representation could 
outstrip cases that they happen to have encountered perceptually in the past, e.g., 
they may simply have imaginatively entertained cases. This might suggest that we 
need to appeal to influences from cognition in order to account for Ethical 
Perception.
All of this might lead us to think that appealing to cognitive penetration is a more 
promising way of accounting for Ethical Perception. In any case, commentators 
and proponents of Ethical Perception have tended to assume that some sort of 
cognitive and conceptual sophistication are required for ethical experience.30 I 
suspect that a reason for this is that discussions may be assuming that versions 
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30 See, e.g., Vayrynen 2008 and Cullison 2010. Cullison appears to appeal to cognitive sophistication to deal 
with the ‘Morally Blind’ objection to Ethical Perception.
of Perceptualism presuppose this, e.g., the Virtue Ethicist’s emphasis upon 
habituation, Cornell Realism’s emphasis on theory-ladenness.
It is worth noting a possible third way between the two models considered. On the 
‘Hybrid’ model I have in mind, a process of intra-perceptual learning gets kick-
started by cognitive penetration.31 This could avoid claiming that the perceptual 
system comes hard-wired for the representation of ethical properties, whilst 
affording cognition an important role. Due to space constraints, in what follows I 
will primarily focus on the simple or ‘synchronic’ cognitive penetration model, but 
will highlight the potential significance of the Hybrid model when appropriate.
Before proceeding to consider the implications of the cognitive penetration model 
for the varieties of Perceptualism, I will briefly relate cognitive penetration and 
Ethical Perception to Robert Audi’s32  recently presented ‘Integration’ model of 
ethical experience which some metaethicists may be more familiar with.
According to Audi, ethical perception involves what he calls the ‘phenomenal 
integration’ of a perception of non-moral base properties (upon which some 
moral property, e.g., wrongness, is consequential33) and some moral ‘experiential’ 
or ‘phenomenal’ element. Examples of the latter include “a phenomenal sense – 
which may, but need not, be emotional – of the moral character of the act”34, an 
“intuitive sense of wrongdoing”35, a nonconceptual “sense of unfittingness”36, or a 
“perceptual moral seeming”37. If one thought that there is such a thing as 
cognitive phenomenology, one might also include ethical judgments (inferential 
or non-inferential) as potential components in Integrated experiences.
13
31 See Cecchi, A., forthcoming, for an account of what he calls diachronic cognitive penetration.
32 See his 2013, Moral Perception.
33 One could presumably hold a reductionist view whilst still endorsing the Integration model.
34 Moral Perception, p. 40
35 Ibid, p. 43
36 Ibid, p. 46
37 Ibid. p. 46
Integration sounds like cognitive penetration. However, Audi doesn’t connect the 
two. Indeed, for all Audi says, Integration is compatible with the following 
process: Integration doesn’t involve the contents of perceptual experience being 
altered by the moral ‘experiential element’, but rather, leads to the formation of 
an overall experience which is the amalgam of non-ethical perceptual experience 
and the experiential element. Strictly speaking, that wouldn’t involve cognitive 
penetration because it doesn’t involve the alteration of perceptual contents and/
or character by cognition. Indeed, this interpretation of Integration wouldn’t 
actually deliver an account of Ethical Perception.
We have some reason to think that the cognitive penetration model of Ethical 
Perception is the most promising of those considered. On that assumption I 
consider implications of this model for the varieties of Perceptualism, beginning 
with Virtue Ethics. 
III. Cognitive Penetration and Virtue
Can a cognitive penetration model of Ethical Perception capture the important 
aspects of virtuous agency, i.e., their ‘perceptual’ ability and its connection with 
motivation?38 Can it do so in a superior way to extant models?
One way to model Ethical Perception would be to claim that cognitively penetrated 
ethical experience were parasitic upon either or both of the alternative models, 
i.e., ethical experiences are facilitated by cognitive penetration by either (i) non-
inferential judgments, e.g., ‘Mary is distressed and needs helping’, constitutive of 
the virtuous agent’s recognitional ability, or, (ii) emotional responses, e.g., 
compassion, which would otherwise directly yield ethical judgment and motivate 
action. This Parasitic Cognitive Penetration model would clearly not require fewer 
theoretical commitments than the judgment and emotional models. I will consider 
whether the model could yield theoretical benefits shortly. 
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38 As I’m characterising the view, Virtue Ethicists are not committed to a particular thesis about the epistemic 
status of ‘perceptual’ judgments, e.g., although they are psychologically non-inferential, they could be 
epistemically inferential. 
Could there be a Non-Parasitic cognitive penetration model? One thought might 
be that the virtuous agent’s recognitional ability (their ‘contentless ability to 
discern reasons’, to employ Dancy’s phrase) could directly influence the contents 
of their experience, rather than its being mediated by judgments that are the 
direct result of the ability. In a recent paper, Nico Silins39 discusses the idea that 
something like a recognitional ability might facilitate high-level perception. 
However, depending on how we fill in the details of the virtuous agent’s 
‘contentless’ recognitional ability - including whether this would count as a 
cognitive capacity, as opposed to a perceptual one - we might doubt that this 
constitutes a cognitive penetration model of Ethical Perception. 
An alternative Non-Parasitic model might appeal to cognitive penetration of 
perception by what Little and McDowell refer to as the virtuous agent’s 
“conception of how to live.” This is supposed to play a key role in motivating the 
virtuous agent (it is, according to McDowell, an ‘orectic state’), but apart from that 
it is not entirely clear what a conception of how to live is supposed to be. Here is 
a suggestion: perhaps the virtuous agent’s conception of how to live is 
constituted by the totality of interdependent ethical and non-ethical beliefs, 
emotional dispositions, experiences, that together shape the way they ‘ethically’ 
see the world. This overall conception - which should not be confused with a 
codified and hierarchical system of principles - might cognitively penetrate their 
experience. Perhaps this Non-Parasitic model could deliver on the ‘perceptual’ 
aspects of the Virtue Ethicist’s model of the virtuous agent. 
Before considering how these cognitive penetration models compare to extant 
judgment and emotional models, it is important to note one limitation of all 
cognitive penetration models for explicating the perceptual capacities of virtuous 
agents. One feature of the virtuous agent appears to be their attentiveness to 
ethically relevant features in the world. Recall the ‘Change of Subject’ example. In 
the example, Jack - a kind person - discerns Mary’s emotional vulnerability and 
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39 Silins, forthcoming, p. 26
the to-be-doneness of a particular action of kindness. We might expect that, 
quite generally, a kind person will be visually attentive to emotional signals in 
those with whom they engage. They are ‘on the look out’ for these sorts of signs. 
In such cases perception plays an important role in facilitating virtuous action. 
However, on standard conceptions, a cognitive state impacting on the subject’s 
attention does not get to count as an instance of cognitive penetration.40 Such 
virtuous patterns of attention do not appear to be captured by a cognitive 
penetration model. 
Putting this limitation aside, do cognitive penetration models have any clear-cut 
theoretical benefits over others? When considering Parasitic models, the answer 
seems to be quite clearly ‘no’. As was noted, this model will inherit the theoretical 
costs of judgment and emotional models. It also saddles proponents with the 
burden of defending high-level perceptual contents, e.g., affordances. The only 
way in which the Parasitic model would have a clear theoretical advantage would 
be if there were some benefit for Virtue Ethicists to positing literal ethical 
perception. However, it is unclear whether a more literal understanding of the 
virtuous agent’s perceptual capacity (i) is actually more literal, since emotions may 
be perceptual experiences, and, (ii) captures better the sorts of features that 
motivated talk of ethical ‘seeing’ in the first place, e.g., uncodifiability. Further, 
perception doesn’t obviously have a comparatively more intimate connection with 
motivation that judgment and emotion41  lack (indeed, emotions appears to be 
more plausible candidates for motivating states). Hence, it is unclear what reasons 
there are for defending a Parasitic model.
Although the Conception of How To Live model doesn’t obviously inherit the 
theoretical burdens of extant judgment and emotional models, it should hopefully 
be clear from the previous discussion that enthusiasm for such a model should be 
muted. It is simply unclear whether a theoretical advance for Virtue Ethics is made 
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40 Although see Lyons 2011 for a contrary view.
41 A candidate emotional state for some of the cases we are interested in - those involving perception of to-
be-doneness - might be what Mandelbaum 1969 referred to as felt-demand.
by appealing to literal ethical perception and cognitive penetration. That, of 
course, doesn’t mean that a cognitive penetration model is bogus. It simply 
means that Virtue Ethicists shouldn’t get too excited about a version of their view 
grounded (at least partially) in a cognitive penetration model of Ethical Perception.
Before ending, let me briefly discuss the work of Iris Murdoch, which can be 
thought of as part of the Virtue Ethics tradition. Murdoch famously places much 
ethical importance on our capacity to ‘see’ the ‘reality’ of other people. However, 
as with other Perceptualists, it isn’t always clear whether this is to be thought of 
as merely metaphorical (she often speaks of the ‘metaphor’ of vision). In any case, 
this much is clear: ‘moral vision’ - roughly, seeing people ‘justly and lovingly’ - 
involves cognitive activity such as “moral imagination and moral effort”42, 
facilitating shifts (perhaps best thought of as gestalt shifts) in the way an 
individual is conceptualised. This sits well with a cognitive penetration model of 
Ethical Perception since ethical vision is facilitated by a cognitive process. 
However, on my reading, Murdoch thinks of the ‘moral effort’ involved in gazing 
upon the other as a primarily cognitive effort. Ethical Perception, as it is being 
conceived in this paper, appears to only be the product of this process of 
attending to others. Hence, its significance for explicating Murdoch’s view might 
be limited.
In the following section I consider the epistemology of cognitively penetrable 
ethical experience. In doing so I clarify whether the model best supports Cornell 
Realism or Perceptual Intuitionism. 
IV. The Epistemology of Cognitively Penetrable Ethical Experience
Cornell Realists and Perceptual Intuitionists both afford an important role to 
ethical experience. However, they appear committed to divergent views about the 
epistemology of such experiences. While Cornell Realists stress the theory-
dependence and epistemically inferential nature of ethical observation, Perceptual 
Intuitionists favour theory-independence and epistemically independent non-
17
42 [1970] 2001, p. 36
inferential justification. In this section I consider which of these is best supported 
by a cognitive penetration model of Ethical Perception, by consideration of the 
epistemology of ethical experience. I argue that Cornell Realism is best supported 
by the model.
In order to make discussion tractable, I will characterise the disagreement among 
the two camps as concerning whether ethical experience is epistemically 
dependent upon its penetrator(s). Recall:
 Epistemic Dependence: A state or process, e, epistemically depends 
 upon another state, d, with respect to content c iff state or process e is 
 justified or justification-conferring with respect to c only if (and partly 
 because) d is justified or justification-conferring with respect to c.
Some clarification of Epistemic Dependence. This does not entail that a 
justification-conferring penetrating state is sufficient to enable the penetrated 
ethical experience to confer justification, merely that it is necessary. Perhaps the 
transition between states must be quasi-inferential: analogous to that involved in 
a paradigm case of good inference (see, e.g., McGrath 2013). Epistemic 
Dependence is also compatible with it being true that some (perhaps all) 
cognitively penetrated ethical experiences do not confer any justification, even if 
the penetrating state is justified. Also, Epistemic Dependence is compatible with 
the view that experiences which are penetrated by unjustified states could confer 
some limited justification, but not enough for outright justified belief. Finally, 
Epistemic Dependence will likely only obtain with respect to specific contents, 
e.g., it is most plausible that it could hold with respect to first-order ethical 
contents attributing ethical properties to objects, persons and events in the world. 
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Prima facie, it may seem that, given their stress on the theory-ladenness of 
observation, a cognitive penetration model of Ethical Perception will sit best with 
Cornell Realism.43
Some degree of theory-ladenness entails a causal dependency of experience upon 
background beliefs. But for cognitive penetration to support Cornell Realism it 
must also be the case that ethical experience is epistemically dependent upon the 
background ‘theory’ that facilitates it (by cognitive penetration). That needs to be 
argued for. I now argue for the conclusion that at least some theory-dependent 
ethical experience is epistemically dependent. 
To focus discussion, consider again the Cat example, but suppose that the 
experience is cognitively penetrated by a cluster of unjustified beliefs - an ethical 
‘theory’ - concerning the wrongness of torturing sentient beings (I’ll leave it to 
the reader to invent some reason why the beliefs are unjustified).
One reason to think that the experience couldn’t confer justification for ethical 
belief, e.g., that what the youths are doing is wrong, is that it seems intuitive that, 
with respect to this ethical content, the experience would inherit the dubious 
epistemic status of the penetrating beliefs. Call this the ED Intuition. Something 
like a ‘rubbish in, rubbish out’44 principle might underlie it.
In order to provide further support for this, we might say that the process of 
cognitive penetration (in the ethical case) is analogous to the processes of belief 
preservation (as occurs in memory) and/or inference (where we progress from 
premises to a conclusion), which both plausibly instantiate an epistemic 
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43 Note, however, that a commitment to theory-ladenness is typically understood as a stronger thesis than 
the Cog-Pen Thesis, since it tends to be associated with the view that perception is continuously and 
thoroughly penetrated, potentially by arbitrarily much of the subject’s beliefs and commitments. Proponents 
of the Cog-Pen thesis need not commit themselves to this, e.g., they could claim that experience is only 
penetrated in cases of expertise. I largely ignore this complication in what follows, but it is worth considering 
whether the Cog-Pen thesis is relevant to Cornell Realism in light of it.
44 This moniker comes from Silins, 2013.
dependence relation.45 Hence, we have good defeasible reasons for thinking that 
cognitively penetrated ethical experiences are also epistemically dependent. 
However, this won’t impress Perceptual Dogmatists,46  according to whom 
experiences, no matter what their etiology, can confer defeasible justification for 
belief. They will respond that this treats experience as if it were just like belief, 
when they are importantly different. On this view, the justification-conferring 
power of perceptual experience comes from its presentational phenomenology. So 
we have reason to resist the ED Intuition since it rests on/or is expressive of a 
bogus view of perceptual epistemology.
In order to evaluate this for ethical experience, it is worth considering what is 
meant by presentational phenomenology. Chudnoff (2011) gives the following 
characterisation:
 “suppose you look at a car and you seem to see that it is red. Further you 
 seem to see its colour - its redness. In this case you seem to see that p - 
 that your car is red - and you seem to see an item - your car’s redness - 
 that makes it true that p. I take this to be an example of presentational 
 phenomenology. More generally: if your perceptual experience is one in 
 which it both seems to you that p and in which you seem to be sensorily 
 aware of an item that makes it true that p, then I will say that your 
 experience has presentational phenomenology with respect to p.” 
Now consider the case of Cat, and suppose that the relevant seeming is that what 
the hoodlums are doing is wrong. It is plausible that you are not perceptually 
aware of an item that makes it the case that what the hoodlums are doing is 
wrong (all-things-considered), despite their setting fire to Cat being a good 
20
45 See Siegel 2013 and Vance forthcoming for discussion.
46 See Huemer 2007, Pryor 2000, 2004. I am using the Perceptual Dogmatist as a representative opponent.
indicator of wrongness.47  Hence, your experience doesn’t have presentational 
phenomenology with respect to wrongness content. If that’s right, then this might 
lead us to downplay the role of phenomenology in ethical experience (at least with 
respect to certain ethical contents), and pay more attention to the etiology of 
experience, i.e., this might make us treat these cases more like that of belief.
Supposing, however, that one rejected this response. Vance (forthcoming) has 
pointed out that at least some experiences which apparently have presentational 
phenomenology - cognitively penetrated emotional experiences - are 
epistemically dependent on their penetrators.48 That is, there are some cases 
where an emotional state, e.g., fear, which is cognitively penetrated by an 
unjustified belief, is, because of this causal influence, itself unjustified.
A Dogmatist might respond here by claiming that if emotions are experiences 
then they aren’t capable of being justified/unjustified. However, in doing so they 
will be going against the consensus in the epistemology of emotion.49 Another 
option for the Dogmatist would be to try to identify some difference between 
perceptual experience and emotion. Here is one suggestion: perhaps we have 
greater control over emotional experience as compared with perceptual 
experience.50 A brief response: assuming that ethical experience is facilitated by 
cognitive penetration, it is not at all obvious that we do have a lesser control over 
our disposition to be in ethical perceptual states, given certain stimuli, compared 
with our disposition to be in emotional states. Both would seem to be susceptible 
to a (limited) degree of diachronic control.
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47  A similar point can be made about Change of Subject and the perception of ought-to-be-doneness. 
However, one might think it more plausible that perceptual experiences could have presentational 
phenomenology with respect to thick ethical properties (those picked out by thick concepts), e.g. cruelty. A 
similar point could be made about prima facie wrongness in Cat.
48  Note that my notion of epistemic dependence is narrower than his. Also, I must confess that it is not 
obvious to me that emotional experiences do have presentational phenomenology, at least in Chudnoff’s 
sense. Note, however, that Vance may only speaks of the feeling that p is revealed to the subject.
49 See, e.g., Brady, 2007, de Sousa 1987, Doring 2003
50 See Tappolet 2012 for this view.
Together, we might think that these considerations constitute a strong case for 
thinking that cognitively penetrated ethical experience is epistemically dependent. 
Hence, we might think that a cognitive penetration model provides some limited51 
degree of support for Cornell Realism over Perceptual Intuitionism.
However, at this point, Perceptual Intuitionists will protest: ethical judgment - 
and, by extension, ethical perception - is very often theory-independent. Even if 
theory-dependent ethical experience is epistemically dependent, we shouldn’t 
assume that theory-independent experience is.
I now show that cognitive penetration doesn’t support Perceptual Intuitionism 
even if we grant that ethical experience is sometimes theory-independent. For 
even if cognitively penetrated ethical experience is theory-independent, it will 
have to be causally dependent upon some penetrating state(s). Here are some 
candidate penetrators in theory-independent ethical experience: emotions, 
intuitions and desires.52 53
To illustrate, suppose that in Cat, my horror at the scene before me penetrates my 
experience. Insofar as one thinks that the perceptual experience could confer any 
justification (and that’s not obvious), it seems that it would be epistemically 
dependent on the emotional experience, i.e., if the emotion was for some reason 
unjustified, then the perceptual experience couldn’t confer justification. A similar 
result seems plausible if we replace the emotion of horror with the intuition that 
what the youths are doing is wrong.
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51  I have not shown that the transition from the background theory to ethical perception involves a sort of 
inference as, e.g., Sturgeon, seems to think.
52 Appealing to these states could perhaps best explain cases where ethical experience seem to run counter 
to our ethical beliefs, e.g., cases of ethical conversion. See Orwell’s “A Hanging” for an actual case of this.
53 One might also include here a conception of how to live, ethical concepts, and imaginative states. In the 
case of a conception of how to live it is not entirely clear why this can’t be rationally assessed, e.g., for 
justifiedness, or its capacity to confer justification. The case of ethical concepts and imagination are trickier 
cases, which unfortunately I don’t have space to consider.
A note about desires: an experience that is cognitively by desire is thought to 
constitute a paradigm case of perceptual experience that fails to justify belief with 
respect to some of its contents. That’s because it involves wishful thinking 
(seeing), and wishful thinking can’t justify you in believing anything. Here is 
Stokes (forthcoming): 
 “plausibly, if a perceptual experience is cognitively penetrated by desire or 
 some other orectic mental state—importantly, such that the experience 
 would not be had without that desire—then that experience cannot justify a 
 belief or provide knowledge.”54 
However, it is worth noting that some philosophers, e.g., Oddie (2005), think that 
desires represent their objects as good, and that they can justify beliefs with this 
sort of content. It is a further question whether all desires can defeasibly justify 
these sorts of beliefs, or whether there are constraints on what constitutes a 
justified desire, e.g., to do with their etiology or their content.55 Whatever account 
of desires we opt for, it seems plausible that the desire would have to be itself 
justified or justification-conferring in order for the penetrated ethical experience 
to be capable of justifying.
To further support the idea that even these theory-independent cognitively 
penetrated experiences are epistemically dependent, consider again Audi’s 
Integration model. Recall that on a non-cognitive penetration interpretation, 
Integration involves the amalgam of a non-ethical perceptual experience and 
‘ethical phenomenal sensing’, e.g., intuitions and emotions). Two points: firstly, it 
seems plausible that an overall experience, of which ethical sensing supplies the 
‘ethical’ component, would be epistemically dependent on ethical sensing, i.e., if 
ethical phenomenal sensing doesn’t justify, then it is hard to accept that the 
overall experience could (with respect to ethical contents). Secondly, the present 
suggestion is that theory-independent penetrated ethical experience is relevantly 
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54 Stokes, p. 13
55 See Parfit 2012 for discussion.
similar to a (non-penetrated) integrated experience. Hence if you think the latter 
are epistemically dependent on their constituents, you have reason to think that 
the former are dependent on their penetrators. 
If this is all correct, then it seems that we have good reasons for thinking that at 
least some, and perhaps all, cognitively penetrated ethical experiences are 
epistemically dependent. What are the implications for Perceptual Intuitionism and 
Cornell Realism? 
Firstly, Perceptual Intuitionism: even if there are some theory-independent, non-
inferentially justified beliefs on the basis of ethical experience, it seems that an 
independently plausible Perceptual Intuitionism may not be supported by a 
cognitive penetration model due to epistemic dependence. Proponents may need 
to give an account of emotional, orectic, or a priori sources of justification.
Does that mean that Perceptual Intuitionism is in trouble? Not necessarily. Firstly, 
one might be sanguine about a version of Perceptual Intuitionism which relies 
upon more ‘basic’ sources of ethical justification. One might adapt the account 
presented by Audi (2013) along these lines. Secondly, although I suggested that a 
cognitive penetration model is most plausible, it is open to Perceptual Intuitionists 
to defend an Intra-Perceptual Learning or Hybrid account. Indeed, these accounts 
might sit better with their commitment to theory-independence (and, perhaps, 
epistemic independence). Finally, Perceptual Intuitionists might try to ground a 
version of their view which doesn’t require Ethical Perception: this could involve 
defending a non-inferential ‘recognitional ability’ view similar to that discussed in 
§3. However, such a model could face problems to do with epistemic 
dependence.56
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56 These alternative models might be appealed to to supplement the cognitive penetration model, i.e., some 
ethical experiences are facilitated by penetration from beliefs based upon ethical experiences brought about 
by Intra-Perceptual Learning, diachronic cognitive penetration, or a non-inferential recognitional ability. Note, 
however, that this would still be to concede that cognitive penetration doesn’t support Perceptual Intuitionism 
since penetrated experiences are epistemically dependent.
Turning now to Cornell Realists: by focusing on theory-laden penetrated 
experiences, things might look promising. Such experiences seem to be 
epistemically dependent and the resulting perceptual beliefs would seem to be 
inferentially justified (at least on restrictive accounts of non-inferential 
justification), as Cornell Realists would be expected to claim. In response to the 
Intuitionist’s claim that there are ‘theory-independent’ experiences Cornell 
Realists will have to claim that these are really theory-dependent, or, that the 
states which facilitate them, e.g., intuitions or emotions, are themselves theory-
dependent. This is, of course, a controversial claim amongst ethicists in a way 
that an analogous claim for scientific observation is less so. Resolving this issue 
is, unfortunately, far beyond the scope of this essay.
V. Conclusion
In this paper I considered the implications of a cognitive penetration model of 
Ethical Perception for three varieties of Perceptualism. I argued that, although the 
model may constitute an additional/alternative way for Virtue Ethicists to 
explicate virtuous agency, it doesn’t constitute a theoretical advance over extant 
models. I then argued that, given that cognitively penetrated ethical experience 
(theory-dependent or independent) appears to be epistemically dependent, this 
favours Cornell Realism over Perceptual Intuitionism. 
It should be borne in mind that all of these conclusions are hostage to there being 
empirical evidence supporting (i) the existence of ‘ethical’ cognitive penetration, 
and, (ii) the specific kinds of cognitive penetration posited by the varieties of 
Perceptualism. To illustrate (ii): it may turn out that there is never cognitive 
penetration by a conception of how to live. 
Finally, we should remember that cognitive penetration may not be necessary for 
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